

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNAI #0012/01 2151453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031453Z AUG 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//THAILAND//
TO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000012

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS: [OVIP](#) [CLINTON](#) [HILLARY](#) [PREL](#) [JA](#) [KN](#) [CH](#)
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 22, 2009
Conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi
Nakasone

¶1. (U) Classified by: Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d)

¶2. (U) July 22, 2009; 3:10 PM Phuket, Thailand

¶3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Secretary
EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell
NSC Senior Director Jeff Bader
Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan
Ambassador Sung Kim
Lieutenant General Paul Selva
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Robert Scher
Nejdat Mulla (Embassy Notetaker)

JAPAN
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone
Deputy Vice-Minister Bessho Koro
Press Secretary Kodama Kazua
Director General Saiki Akitaka
Director General Umemoto Kazuyoshi
Director General Inomata Hiroshi
Director Yoshida Tomoyuki
Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Takizaki Shigeki

¶4. (C) In a bilateral meeting on July 22 at the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Phuket, Thailand, the Secretary and
Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone discussed a
broad range of issues relating to the U.S. { Japan
bilateral security relationship. The Secretary told FM
Nakasone that U.S. security commitments to Japan were
unwavering and that the United States was committed to
working closely with Japan on the range of global
security issues, and particularly on the irreversible
denuclearization of North Korea. Nakasone echoed the
affirmation of the security relationship; both sides
agreed to continuing close multilateral cooperation on
North Korea. Nakasone said recently passed United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 should be given
time to have an effect on the DPRK, and expressed
concern about recent North Korean overtures for
Ambassador Bosworth to travel there. He requested the
United States consult with Japan and South Korea about
North Korean issues before approaching China and Russia.
On other issues, Nakasone said Japan was concerned about
the opaque nature of China's military spending, and
stood ready to assist with establishing a dialogue
between the United States and Burma or Iran. END
SUMMARY.

Bilateral Commitment Unwavering

¶5. (C) The Secretary told FM Nakasone that U.S. security
commitments to Japan were unwavering and that the United

States is committed to working closely with Japan on a range of global security issues, and particularly the irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. Nakasone said Japan looked forward to continuing our strong alliance "in a multilateral fashion" and appreciated the proposal for a presidential visit.

--
North Korea: Continued Cooperation and Close Consultation

--
¶16. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's response in the United Nations to North Korea's missile launch, and support for UNSCR 1874. She underscored the importance of working closely to respond to North Korean provocations, and said the United States would not be provoked. She urged Japan to continue to work with China towards a concrete strategy for a denuclearized North Korea.

¶17. (C)FM Nakasone advocated putting real pressure on the DPRK regime, while allowing UNSCR 1874 time to have an effect. He expressed concern regarding a North Korean invitation to Ambassador Bosworth to travel to North Korea and said such a visit would be premature before 1874 sanctions had some effect. It was important to proceed cautiously and consult with Japan and South Korea before moving forward on any decision about engaging North Korea bilaterally. Such a visit would undercut the collective will to allow the sanctions to put real pressure on the regime. External cooperation must be visible to dissuade North Korea from taking escalatory steps; the United States, Japan, and South Korea must work together to set the pace for reengagement. Although Five Party consultations are one way to move forward, they must be conducted in a way that would be conducive to re-starting Six Party talks.

¶18. (C)FM Nakasone said the Six Party talks needed a new approach. Japan would no longer make "double payments" nor let North Korea use "salami tactics" to slice-up proposals and incentives. Any new approach must convince North Korea of the necessity of taking verifiable, irreversible action to denuclearize. Japan wanted close coordination between the United States, Japan, and South Korea prior to consultations with China or Russia. He also underscored, however, the important role China can play in modifying North Korean behavior. Japan would like to have regular bilateral discussions on China's role in this issue. He had spoken earlier to Chinese FM Yang regarding the future of the Six Party talks and the need to be cautious with China's military engagement with North Korea. Nakasone said he was concerned that Thailand's move to introduce North Korean language for the Chair's statement would undermine a robust ARF message.

¶19. (C) The Secretary emphasized we must do all we can to enforce UNSC 1874 and find specific ways to impose consequences; the United States had established a specific unit to coordinate our efforts. The United States intended to continue close consultations with Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia and avoid double payments or "salami tactics." China's role was critical, and five party talks were relevant to get North Korea back to Six Party talks about permanent, irreversible denuclearization. The Secretary praised Japan's work on contingency planning for North Korea.

Engaging Burma

¶10. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's assistance and support on Burma. The United States was primarily concerned with the state of democratic reform

in the country and its growing relationship with North Korea. The Junta continued to pursue advanced and offensive weapons; the possibility that North Korea might transfer nuclear technology to Burma was real. It was critical for the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), as such a move would open up real opportunities for engagement with the United States, including investment.

¶11. (C) FM Nakasone said Japan was disturbed by the legal action against ASSK. Japan had placed a high value on the visit by UNSYG Ban to Burma and was dismayed when the regime would not allow him to meet ASSK. Nakasone had told his Burmese counterpart that he should seriously consider the U.S. offer for dialogue.

China: Need for More Transparency

¶12. (C) Japan was concerned with China's military opaqueness and apparent interest in expanding its influence eastward to the sea, and China's nuclear disclosures, Nakasone stressed. The Secretary agreed on the need for more transparency in China's defense spending and planning. The United States hoped to move forward with a U.S.-Japan-Chinese trilateral at the policy planning level; we must continue to include China in a multilateral dialogue to ensure its peaceful rise, but we need to see more transparency as well.

Iran

¶13. (C) Iran's continued violation of international nuclear obligations concerned the United States. The Secretary asked FM Nakasone to convey to Iran that it had an opportunity it could not miss, and raised Japanese export credits. The FM replied that while the post-election situation in Iran was deplorable, Japan planned to make the most of its unique position by maintaining a high level dialogue with the regime while taking into account U.S. and EU initiatives and concerns on the nuclear issue. Iran must take measures to address uranium enrichment activities. Nakasone had encouraged Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to engage the United States. Japan was prepared to assist in laying down the foundations for a dialogue. Nakasone asserted that Japanese export credits were decreasing and were not larger than those issued by European countries.

Other Issues: India and Russia

¶14. (C) Nakasone said the United States and Japan needed to continue strengthening relationships with India. Japan held a strategic dialogue with India earlier in July. Japan also would like to hold a conference for intellectuals from Japan, Russia, and the United States on security in the Asia Pacific region; he requested U.S. support for the conference, as well as for Japan's efforts to deal with its territorial dispute with Russia.

CLINTON